In recent years, polarization has become a major topic in both academic and public discourse (Bernaerts et al., 2023; Gentzkow, 2016). Driven by rising levels in the U.S. (Pew Research Center, 2014) and elsewhere, it has gained buzzword status in the media. Yet, (affective) polarization remains a real threat to liberal democracies, as it can accelerate democratic backsliding (Orhan, 2022). Türkiye is often cited as a striking example, with polarization said to have deepened significantly after the failed 2016 coup, reaching levels that “even optimists ought to be worried about” (Erdogan, 2016: 1).
The headscarf has long symbolized the rift between secularist and conservative Muslim communities. In the 1990s and 2000s, its prohibition in public institutions and universities sparked mass student protests and led to a case before the European Court of Human Rights (Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, 2024).
However, two decades on, its role in the secular–religious divide appears more complex. Among Turkish youth, polarization increasingly centers on ideas rather than identities (Uzun & Lüküslü, 2024). This article draws on in-depth interviews conducted in spring 2024 with veiled (kapalı) and unveiled (açık) students at Istanbul University. The findings suggest the headscarf no longer carries the polarizing weight it once did, as many female students actively pursue mutual tolerance. While the divide has not disappeared, the fading intensity of this once-heated issue indicates that even entrenched societal conflicts can evolve toward consensus.
The following section offers a brief historical overview of the headscarf in modern Turkey, laying the groundwork for my research. It highlights an underexplored dimension of contemporary Turkish society and challenges the prevailing assumption that the headscarf remains as politically and socially contentious as it once was.
Depoliticization of the headscarf
A key feature of Turkish society and politics is the enduring centre–periphery cleavage, as first conceptualized by Mardin (1973). This divide is so pronounced that Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) described Turkish society as having a ‘dual structure’: on one side, individuals who identify as secular; on the other, those who define themselves as Islamist. The Turkish Republic, founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was built on staunch secularist principles. Atatürk regarded Islam—symbolized in part by the headscarf—as a relic of the Ottoman past and incompatible with the vision of a modern republic. Consequently, the figure of the ‘modern republican woman’ was expected to abandon the veil. Although a formal ban on the headscarf was not enacted until 1982, the state’s broader discouragement of Islamic symbols and practices sparked a political backlash. From the 1970s onwards, this backlash coalesced into a growing Islamist movement, ultimately culminating in the election of the Islamic-conservative President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2002 (Arik, 2012).
With polarization between secularists and conservative Muslims increasing under President Erdogan, combined with historic association, it would be easy to assume that the headscarf would play a large role in this divide. However, the headscarf does not seem to grab the attention of media headlines in the way that it once used to. So much so in fact, that even the main opposition party (CHP) is now softening up their stance on a headscarf ban, a long-standing and once core policy of the party (Al Jazeera, 2023). But how could this be? The main fault lines on which Turks polarize have certainly not changed and Erdogan’s populist rhetoric has only aggravated this division further (Aydin-Düzgit & Balta, 2019). The headscarf has been perhaps the most defining issue in the quarrels between secularists and conservative Muslims in the late 1990’s and 2000’s. Given that polarization can affect personal relationships (McCoy et al., 2018) and the different voting preferences of veiled and non-veiled women (Bayyurt & Caha, 2020), this seeming decline in social conflict surrounding the headscarf is as intriguing as it is seemingly counter-intuitive.
Therefore, I embarked on an exchange semester to Istanbul University (IU) to research this from a closer perspective for my BSc thesis. IU holds a remarkably significant place in the history of the headscarf debate. It is where many of the larger protests against the headscarf ban took place due to its particularly strict enforcement of the headscarf ban (TRT, 2023). Furthermore, Leyla Sahin, the woman famous for dragging the Turkish state to the ECtHR over it, is among its alumni (32. Gün, 2023). All this made it a specifically interesting site for this study.
From my Western perspective I hypothesised that even though veiled and non-veiled students may now share educational spaces, this would not have led to the complete disappearance of this once potent issue. Before arriving in Istanbul, I had thus painted a mental picture of veiled girls and non-veiled girls somewhat awkwardly going through the necessary niceties of the classroom and swiftly rejoining their totally homogenous (veiled or non-veiled) friend groups as soon as possible after classes. I also imagined that there would be clearly visible signs of out-group dislike with both veiled and non-veiled students.
The work of Uzun and Lüküslü (2024), however, raised my suspicion of this hypothesis. They quantitatively demonstrated that sociocultural identities (being religious or not) among the youth in Türkiye were creating issue-based polarization, but that this polarization did not extend into an affective one, suggesting a complex and nuanced landscape of political engagement and potential for bridging divides1.
Seeing that practically all available data tended to be quantitative and that there were different patterns in polarization among the youth, I decided to zoom in on this situation using a qualitative approach. Through ten in-depth interviews with four veiled and six non-veiled female IU students, I inquired after how these young respondents felt sharing a campus or classroom with a supposed ‘other’ and if there had ever been any uncomfortable – or even conflictual-situations due to this. The manuscript resulting from this research was selected as one of the three best papers of my class. Below, I expand upon my findings.
Takeaways from a qualitative study of polarization around the headscarf with Turkish female students
Given my above-mentioned initial expectations, my findings added to my suspicions raised by the recent literature. In retrospect, it seems my work has shed a -albeit modestly sized- light on the motley landscape suggested above.
For starters, both veiled and non-veiled students expressed that ‘times had changed’. The stark polarization of days of old was repeatedly contrasted with a more tolerant contemporary social and political landscape. Participants found it remarkably difficult to make large claims about ‘the other’ and highlighted the non-monolithic nature of both ‘camps’ in this supposed divide. The headscarf had become a flawed predictor of character, and many claimed they totally disregarded being veiled or not as a factor for friendship. This attitude was claimed to be a recent development and predominant among the youth who grew up in the absence of the old headscarf ban. The lifting of the ban was therefore a sort of generational divide with older women on both sides of the divide being seen as more polarized.
This is remarkable, as the “us versus them” dynamic within identity-based polarization seems to be losing meaning among these participants. This ties into previous findings that the youth seem not to be polarizing in an affective way in Türkiye (Uzun & Lüküslü, 2024).
Notably, hints of liberal philosophy underscored this newfound pacification among the youth. A principle of non-interference was often mentioned along with tolerance and human rights as an argument not too dissimilar from Leyla Sahin’s in the Sahin v Turkey ECtHR case.
As a logical consequence, many of the participants had ‘mixed’ friend groups consisting of both veiled and non-veiled girls. It was often the case that a veiled girl was best friends with a non-veiled girl. A sentiment of respect was persistent. Consequently, the veil was often mentioned to not be a factor at all anymore when friendships were being initiated. These ‘mixed’ friend groups were also seen as the norm. Interestingly, the IÜ campus was mentioned to be a meeting ground where this historic divide was being bridged. Considering the scarred history of IU, this finding makes a most interesting addition to our understanding of this underexplored landscape.
However, this newfound tolerance among the youth is by no means proof that the problem has totally disappeared. While many participants reported to have no problems with becoming friends with each other, the wearing of the veil still had lifestyle implications which led some participants to question whether they would ever be fully compatible. Despite others being more optimistic about the feasibility of peaceful coexistence, it was clear that the old divide somewhat remains. Notably, many veiled participants mentioned they had anecdotes of blatant discrimination on the basis of their headscarf. Others openly mentioned they unintentionally tended to have more friends of their own in-group.
Both sides also mentioned that there were still certain places and situations in which they didn’t feel total belonging. The bar was mentioned as a place veiled women tended to avoid due to feeling singled out, while public Iftar dinners or pro-Palestinian protests were mentioned as places where non-veiled women felt out of place. Adding on to this, Istanbul’s diverse neighbourhoods were mentioned as geographical expressions of this divide, with places like Kadiköy and Fatih being represented as a ‘home base’ of non-veiled and veiled women respectively.
Conclusion
This article is a summary in layman’s terms of a research I conducted for my bachelor’s thesis at Vrije Universiteit Brussel while on an exchange semester to Istanbul University, a particularly interesting site considering the history of Turkish polarization and the headscarf. While I by no means claim this to be a study with universally representative results, its findings shed light on an underexplored aspect of Turkish society.
Given my prior expectations of a stark case of polarization, I was surprised to find that the headscarf seems to have lost the weight it once had amongst the youth. Despite the echoes of this divided past lingering on, open conflict like we saw in the 1990’s nevertheless looks to be highly unlikely for the time being. For now, it seems that the lifting of the headscarf ban has led to a generation who, despite their sometimes-acknowledged differences, have learned to live together in respectful liberal tolerance.
I therefore left Istanbul with a certain sense of optimism. Seeing these students put aside a scarred history of division and conflict and replace it with tolerance and friendship reminds us of the persistent possibility of peace. In a world full of seemingly increasing misery and despair, we could all learn something from the way in which these students have learned to put their differences aside and live with each other peacefully.
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Yunus Poblome is completing a MSc in Political Science at Vrije Universiteit Brussel. His research focuses on far-right populism and international politics. He previously interned within the EU HORIZON REDIRECT project under Prof. Eline Severs and served on the board of the Olivaint Conference of Belgium. He writes at the-analytic-hour.com. Contact: yunus.poblome@gmail.com.
