

International Authority of International Organizations and Access Provision for Transnational Actors

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Abstract

Why do some international organizations (IOs) provide more institutional access for transnational actors (TNAs) into their policy processes than others? I argue that the international authority of IOs plays an important role in shaping the level of access provision. IOs with high and low international authority levels provide less access than IOs with medium levels of authority. High authority IOs have no functional needs in involving TNAs. Low authority IOs are not mandated with tasks that may require additional input by TNAs. In contrast, IOs with medium levels of authority experience an institutional shortage of authority for achieving the goals of their mandates. For this reason, they see a strong functional benefit in involving TNAs as a way to overcome their authority limitations. I employ regression analysis using existing datasets in order to test the hypothesis. Statistical results support the argument.

Keywords

Access Provision; International Organizations; IO-TNA Relations; Quantitative Analysis; Transnational Actors

Introduction

International organizations (IOs) came to dominate the international scene as the main forums for global policy-making (Johnson, 2016: 738). However, in today's world, states and IOs are not the only actors in global governance as they were joined by an increasing number of transnational actors (TNAs) such as non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, global policy networks, multinational companies, private lobby actors and epistemic communities (Johnson, 2016: 738). As IOs are the main arenas for the global management of the world, they have been facing the issue of how to accommodate, engage or limit the increasing number and importance of TNAs. Considering the increasing complexity of today's global affairs, why and how IOs do so become an important area of research.

Yet, International Relations (IR) literature expressed a limited interest in IO-TNA relations. Firstly, the most of academic literature on IO-TNA relations are dominated by comparative case studies approach. Although these studies provide empirically rich analyses, the levels to which their findings can be generalized across a wider scope of IOs is at least questionable. Possibly, the absence of reliable and comprehensive datasets in the past has been one of the key reasons for the lack of quantitative studies in this specific domain. With the release of TRANSACCESS data by Tallberg et al. (2014: 741), on which this paper builds on, extensive data-driven comparative analysis became possible.

Secondly, the IR literature also failed in taking seriously the self-interested behavior of IOs to explain their relations with TNAs. The literature is still dominated by a state-centric approach to global governance, and although states indeed are the main drivers of international cooperation, it still should not constrain our perception of IOs to empty shells filled with state interests. Such understanding not only detaches the academia from the empirical facts, but also limits its ability to explain the complexity of states-IO-TNA trio, and to contribute important knowledge into the policy-making process of improving inter-institutional cooperation.

The present paper addresses both of these limitations. The puzzle it aims to investigate is as follows: considering IOs as self-interested actors, what motivates some IOs to provide extensive access for TNAs into their policy-making processes, and what motivates other IOs to provide limited or no access? I argue that this variation can be explained by authority limitations of IOs. Different levels of authority result in different abilities and willingness of IOs to provide access. Highly authoritative IOs have the highest ability to provide access but they are unwilling to do so. IOs with a low authority neither have the ability nor willingness for access provision. IOs with a medium level of authority, due the limited authority, experience strong functional need in the involvement of TNAs. As such, the argument makes access provision less contingent on members' interests and

more on IOs' own functional preferences. I test my argument on the original panel dataset of 29 IOs from 1950 till 2010. Statistical results provide the support for the argument illustrating inverse U-shaped relationship between authority and access.

Literature Review

IOs have experienced a gradual evolution of their transnational dimensions, which are comparable to their original pre-dominantly intergovernmental orientation (Cronin, 2002: 55; Willetts, 2000: 199; Alger, 2002: 109). The rise of TNAs as important actors on the international arena pushed IOs to accommodate the demands and utilize the benefits that come from the interaction with them (Pevehouse et al., 2001: 103; Alger, 2002: 110). Although this gives a foundation for arguing about the self-directedness of IOs in global affairs, the IR literature keeps focusing on member-states as the main drivers behind any of IOs' accommodation of TNAs. As it will be illustrated below, dominant schools of IR provide little space for self-interested behavior of IOs in the access provision.

Neoliberal institutionalism considers IOs as rationally designed institutions created by states to solve their cooperation problems (Koremenos et al., 2001: 761). Consequently, the involvement of TNAs is also a design choice based on the future utility that such involvement will bring to international cooperation among states (Tallberg, 2010: 48; Kahler, 2005: 145). States will allow IOs to provide more participation opportunities for TNAs if such participation promises functional benefits (Raustiala, 1997: 730; Tallberg, 2010: 55). TNAs can serve as useful partners in collecting and analyzing information, bringing new issues to international agenda and acting as implementation partners on the local level (Raustiala, 1997: 731; Raustiala, 2004: 389).

In contrast, according to realism, states design access for TNAs not to solve cooperation problems, but to advance their own national interests (Tallberg, 2010: 62). Relative gains from international cooperation are the main concern for states, as such the involvement of TNAs will be allowed only when it helps to increase the gains of members relative to the previous power balance arrangement. The interests of major powers dominate any cooperative arrangement, which helps realists to explain the global emergence of TNAs by the dominance of the United States' power in international relations and its interests on keeping its power projection through like-minded IOs and TNAs (Gilpin, 1975: 96). Realists do not deny the functional benefits of TNAs, but they emphasize the power distribution as the main explanatory variable in allowing them to participate in international policy-making (Tallberg, 2010: 62). As such, TNAs that were provided with access to IOs are primarily oriented to serve the interests of the current major power and only those TNAs that align with the major power's interests are to be provided with such access (Tallberg, 2010: 62).

Constructivism proposes international norms as affecting the access provision by IOs. In the face of intensifying discourse on democratic deficit in global governance, the new norms of global civil society and global democracy pushed IOs to more transparency, accountability and participation in international policy-making processes (Checkel, 2005: 805; Steffek et al., 2008: 45). Discourse on democratic deficit put into danger policies created by international bodies, and the bodies themselves (Vaubel, 2006: 128). It follows then that providing participation opportunities for TNAs should help to address democratic deficit as they are perceived as the representatives of global civil society (Checkel, 2005: 810; Steffek et al., 2008: 55). IOs, however, are not seen as the ones who initiate the access provision. As democratic deficit threatens not only IOs, but also states that allowed them to solve global issues and create policy responses, pushed by domestic constituents, states have strong preferences in providing TNAs with involvement opportunities. The emergence of global democracy norm itself is associated with the dominance of democratic powers on the international arena (Grigorescu, 2007: 626). Major powers tend to diffuse norms that emerged in domestic settings on the international arena to create the community of like-minded states and actors. Since democratic powers have dominated much of IOs in the past decades, the prominence of global democracy norm is associated with their efforts to bring more accountability and transparency that originated from their national discourses to the international level.

The present study extends the neoliberal institutionalist logic in explaining access provision, but instead of putting emphasis on states' interests, the theoretical argument that will be presented below highlights the importance of self-interest of IOs, namely their desire to be able to perform tasks on their own, as an important explanatory factor.

Theoretical Argument

I define international authority as institutionalized power of IOs to make collective binding decisions on the behalf of, but autonomously from, their member-states (Hooghe and Marks, 2015: 309). International authority has legal-rational character (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 707). It is "institutionalized, i.e. codified in recognized rules; circumscribed, i.e. specifying who has authority over whom for what; impersonal, i.e. designating roles, not persons; territorial, i.e. exercised in territorially defined jurisdictions" (Hooghe et al., 2017: 14). Legalization of authority through codified rules and procedures provides the main basis for legitimizing international authority (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 707-708). It clearly defines the hierarchy of institutionalized relations as collectively agreed.

Authority of IOs is constituted by delegation and pooling (Hooghe and Marks, 2015: 310). While delegation reflects the supranational, pooling refers to intergovernmental dimension of international authority. Delegation is a *grant* of authority to the international secretariat of an IO to

take, institutionally independent of state control roles in the overall decision-making of the organization (Hooghe and Marks, 2015: 311). Institutional independence stems from the fact that national governments do not hold privately accountable the officials of the secretariat (Hooghe et al., 2017: 24).

Pooling is a *transfer* of authority from individual member-states to the body of an IO, which consists of nationally selected representatives of member-states, where member-states cede their national veto to some form of majoritarian collective decision-making (Hooghe et al., 2017: 24). Such bodies inside an IO can take the form of national assemblies or boards of executives, where national representatives are directly selected by their national governments (Hooghe and Marks, 2015: 324-325).

International Authority and Transnational Access

Institutional access provision by IOs is an institutionalized mechanism that allows transnational actors to take part at different stages of policy-making (Tallberg et al., 2014: 724). As the definition of international authority, the institutional access also focuses on its legal-rational character as codified in legal rules of IOs. Importantly, access does not imply the actual participation of TNAs in IOs, but only the presence of opportunity for such engagement.

To illustrate how international authority and institutional access link, I look at the IOs authority as one single continuum ranging from the extreme high level to the extreme low level. Along this continuum, I differentiate between the levels of access by looking at IOs' *opportunity* and *willingness* for access provision. *Opportunity* is an ability of IOs to provide access for TNAs, while *willingness* is IOs' perception of utility of TNAs' involvement for the advancement of the goals of their mandates. Considering the difference in access provision between IOs with the highest and lowest levels of authority, we have to remember that these are *idealized* theoretical cases, which are useful in order to provide a comparative outlook and threshold points for measuring the real-life levels of authority. I argue that IOs with high authority have opportunity for access provision, but they are not willing to do so. IOs with low authority neither have opportunity nor willingness for access provision. Lastly, IOs with medium authority have higher level of opportunity than the ones with low authority, and very high level of willingness compared to high authority IOs (Table 1).

Table 1: International Authority and Opportunity and Willingness for Access Provision.

IO Authority	Pooling	Delegation	Opportunity	Willingness
High	Highest level	Highest level	High	Low

Low	Lowest level	Lowest level	Low	Low
Medium	Low level	High level	High	High

Source: author.

High Authority IOs and Access Provision

In an idealized IO with the highest levels of delegated and pooled authority, member-states exercise minimized control over the secretariat, while the IO itself enjoys significant budget, and final decision-making autonomy. These IOs can be characterized in three aspects: first, they have extensive regulatory competence in the specific policy area they are operating in, possibly to the level of being international rule creating body; second, they have all the necessary resources, including financial and technical-scientific, for implementation of their international policies; and last, considering the two factors mentioned above, they are considered to be the main international rule-making authorities in their policy domain, as such, they enjoy taken-for-granted legitimacy (Abbott et al., 2015: 21; Genschel and Zangl, 2014: 339). With such authority, IOs may effectively govern international issues on their own. However, these IOs are not closed to TNAs, and they do have enough institutional capabilities to provide access. In fact, high authority IOs are the ones who have the highest opportunity for access provision, and the majority of TNAs are more than willing to work with these IOs due to legitimacy and reputation that they will gain (Abbott et al., 2015: 21). However, these IOs do not perceive an urgent utility for their goals in access provision.

Member-states still may want to involve transnational actors for two reasons: either when there is functional need in additional expertise, or states may want to institute additional controlling mechanism over international bureaucracies (Tallberg et al., 2014: 743). In high authority IOs, member-states may want to involve TNAs in order to establish additional monitoring system over international secretariats, illustrated through the concept of “fire alarms” (Hawkins et al., 2006: 12). However, having considered the fact that high authority IOs operate within specific policy domains over which member-states are willing to retain national control, members may be afraid that involvement of TNAs may bring up harmful criticism or advocacy for policies that will not serve their domestic interests.

Low Authority IOs and Access Provision

Alternatively, IOs with the lowest levels of delegated and pooled authority neither enjoy policy and budget independence, nor they are tasked with any extensive mandate that would require such independence. As such, these IOs are delegated with minimized levels of regulatory competence, operational capacity or taken-for-granted legitimacy.

These IOs are dominated by intergovernmentalism, with secretariats playing only administrative and supportive roles in negotiations of states. Their mandates do not require any additional input by TNAs. Although their policy scope may be quite extensive, member-states themselves may want to negotiate and co-operate with TNAs without the intermediary function of IOs because of domestic sensitivity to issues that they cannot compromise over. TNAs will not be willing to work with them, as these IOs neither can provide TNAs with additional resources and rewards for their job, nor do these TNAs will receive international reputation or legitimacy for working with such low authority IOs. These IOs do not have enough opportunity nor are mandated with extensive tasks to be willing to engage with TNAs.

Medium Authority IOs and Access Provision

Having established these two extreme threshold points, we now turn to the authority area where the most of current IOs operate within –the one of medium international authority. These IOs may have a variety of combinations of regulatory competence, operational capacity, legitimacy, and the involvement of TNAs helps them to complement their deficiencies. I argue that exactly this capability gap pushes them to pursue states to establish institutional channels for access provision for TNAs, as it is essential for the achievement of collective goals.

Medium authority IOs have a relatively higher level of delegation, as they usually handle an extensive scope of issues, but a lower level of pooling, with member-states willing to keep things under their national veto. As such, these IOs are faced with functional dilemma: on one hand, they have an extensive list of issues that they should solve, but their hands are tied by member-states' control mechanisms, which means that every decision taken by the secretariats should gain approval of the members. This makes international policy-making and implementation inefficient, as by the time the secretariat gets the permission to act, the issue may evolve in an unexpected way, and the old policy may no longer be relevant. These IOs are not able to hierarchically govern states through the creation of international laws and enforcement mechanisms, neither they have powers to directly access private actors protected by national jurisdictions in order to ensure the compliance with international policies (Abbott et al., 2015: 24).

The access provision for TNAs helps IOs to overcome these limitations. Firstly, even the soft involvement of TNAs may help an IO to indirectly *manage* states into compliance with international norms and policies, through public naming and shaming that may re-shape interests and behavior of member-states in alignment with the IO's mandate goals (Abbott et al., 2015: 24). Secondly, TNAs also help an IO to *bypass* states in accessing private actors operating under the umbrella of national sovereign jurisdictions, without dealing with states as intermediaries (Abbott et

al., 2015: 24). In both cases, IOs avoid entering into conflict with member-states over foreign intervention into domestic affairs with the help of TNAs.

Medium authority IOs may use the existing access mechanisms and expand them over time by illustrating that they are essential for the fulfillment of their mandate. The main difference between high and medium authority IOs is that both have the opportunity to expand access over time, but only medium authority IOs go for it. As such, I propose the following hypothesis for the empirical testing:

H: *Ceteris paribus*, international organizations with the medium level of international authority provide the higher level of access to transnational actors than international organizations with the high and low levels of authority.

Methodology

In order to test the hypothesis, I compile a panel dataset containing information on the levels of authority and access provision among 29 international organizations in the period from 1950 to 2010. As such, the unit of analysis is an international organization in a year. To qualify as such, an international body should be “a formal organization for collective decision-making among at least three-member states”, created “among national governments”, and “structured by rules for a continuous purpose” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 36). IOs in the dataset range from global to regional organizations, covering a variety of different policy issues ranging from energy, free trade, security and environment among others (see Appendix 2). Although it does not cover all existing IOs in the international system, the sample of 29 IOs present in the dataset covers an extensive period of time from 1950 to 2010 with more than 1000 observations.

Independent Variables

I operationalize the international authority of IOs through two variables, *Delegation* and *Pooling*, which come from Measuring International Authority dataset by Hooghe et al. (2017: 105). Both variables range from 0 to 1, 0 being the lowest level of delegation and pooling, and 1 being the highest level of both.

Delegation is operationalized as “an annual measure of the allocation of authoritative competences to non-state bodies in IO’s decision-making process” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 105). It consists of political delegation and judicial delegation. Political delegation is measured across the bureaucratic bodies within an IO that are composed of non-state actors and have institutionalized ability to “exercise or co-exercise authority” over agenda-setting and final decision-making across six following decision areas: membership accession, membership suspension, constitutional reform, budgetary allocation, financial non-compliance, and policy-making in up to five different issue areas

(Hooghe et al., 2017: 105). Judicial delegation is a “conditional grant of authority to courts, arbitrators, or tribunals” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 105).

Pooling measures “the extent to which member states share authority through collective decision making” (Hooghe et al., 2017: 113). Pooling is measured by looking at voting rules across the bodies of an IO that involves members’ decision-making in the two processes: (1) agenda-setting, and (2) final decision-making on the six decision areas mentioned above (Hooghe et al., 2017: 113). Because of proposed non-linear relationship, I created square term variables for *Delegation* and *Pooling* in each year of the dataset, and labeled them as *Delegation_SQ* and *Pooling_SQ*.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, the level of access provided by IOs to TNAs, is operationalized through *TNA Access* index created by Sommerer and Tallberg (2017: 249). *TNA Access* is composed of four indicators: the depth of access; the range of access; the permanence of access; and the level of codification of access (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254).

The *depth* of access is the level of TNAs involvement into IOs’ activities (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254). The *range* is the level of exclusiveness of access to some particular type of TNAs (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254). The overall *TNA Access* index is the combination of depth and range multiplied by two additional institutional indicators – permanence, which is the level of sustainability of access over time, and codification, which is the level to which access is codified in formal rules (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254). *TNA Access* ranges from 0 to 12, 0 indicating the total absence of access, while 12 indicating the ideal type of access into all decision-making activities for all kinds of TNAs on a permanent and codified basis.

Control Variables

I also include eight additional variables in order to control for biased estimates. The data for these variables is taken from TRANSACCESS dataset (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 251). Firstly, it is argued that the heterogeneity of preferences of member-states may have an effect on the level of IOs’ access provision for TNAs. However, there is no clear agreement between scholars on this: while some argue that goal divergence among members leads to the limited authority of an IO, as a result of which the IO will seek TNAs’ involvement to complement its limited capabilities; others argue that if members have similar interests, they are more likely to design more institutional access mechanisms for TNAs (Abbott et al., 2015: 27). The variable *Affinity of Members* is based on the voting patterns of member-states of IOs in the United Nations General Assembly, and measures yearly average policy interest convergence among all possible combinations of member-states of each IO in the dataset (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 254).

Secondly, overlapping logic applies to the argument of democratic memberships: IOs that are dominated by like-minded democracies tend to provide more access for TNAs as an extension of domestic democratic principles such as transparency and accountability to the global level (Grigorescu, 2007: 626). The variable *Democratic Members* captures the average score of the level of democracy among the member-states of each IO as aggregated based on Polity IV scores.

Thirdly, in following constructivist argument that democratic major power in the membership of an IO diffuses its norms and values on the IO and its members, for example through promoting more access opportunities for TNAs (Grigorescu, 2007: 626), I add the *Democratic Major Power* dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if there is a democratic major power in an IO in a year without any other power of non-democratic character, and 0 if not (Sommerer and Tallberg, 2017: 260).

Fourthly, I include two dummy variables in order to test whether the sovereignty concerns of member-states affect the level of access provision. The argument is that members may fear that the involvement of TNAs may touch upon their sovereign domestic affairs in undesired or unexpected ways, as such they would like to avoid their involvement in two cases: if an IO's secretariat has major legally binding decision and rule-making capabilities, and if an IO operates in the field of international security (Tallberg et al., 2014: 756). The dummies *Decision* and *Security* take the values of 1 if an IO has major decision-making functions and engages in international security issues, and 0 if otherwise.

Finally, in order to account for the argument about the functional need for TNAs involvement, I also include three more control variables that specify the kind of tasks that IOs perform: *Technical Complexity*, *Local Activities*, and *Non-Compliance Incentives*. IOs are interested in providing access for TNAs if their mandate tasks are “technically complex, require local implementation and present significant noncompliance incentives, and where the relevant information – policy expertise, implementation knowledge, and compliance information – is held by societal actors” (Tallberg et al., 2014: 754). The measure of technical complexity of an IO's mandate ranges from 0 to 1, while the measures of the need for local implementation, and of the level of possible non-compliance incentives range from 0 to 2.


Since this study uses large-T and small-N panel data, meaning extensive time period (1950-2010) relative to a limited number of IOs (29), I employ two-way fixed effect model to account for how the authority and access levels within IOs change over time. The model includes squared delegation ($Delegation_{SQ_{it}}$) and pooling ($Pooling_{SQ_{it}}$) terms to account for non-linear causal relationship, organization (u_i) and time (v_t) fixed effects in addition to control variables ($\sum \gamma X_{it}$) and error term (ϵ_{it}). The overall base model looks as following:

$$TNA\ Access_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Delegation_{it} + \beta_2 Pooling_{it} + \beta_3 Pooling_SQ_{it} + \beta_4 Delegation_SQ_{it} + \sum \gamma X_{it} \\ + u_i + v_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

Results

Before jumping into the empirical results, it is worth to take a minute to look at anecdotal evidence coming from the dataset. Figure 1 illustrates the correlation between the degree of access provision with the level of pooling in 29 IOs in 2010, while in the Figure 2, pooling is substituted with delegation.

Figure 2: Association between the level of pooling and TNA Access in 2010.




Source: author.

From both figures it is evident that on the scale from 0 to 1, the maximum levels of pooling and delegation in the dataset reach only 0.3 and 0.25, which may seem as an indication of absence of high authority IOs in the dataset. However, as it was mentioned in the theory section, high and low authority are idealized cases that serve the theoretical purpose of providing a comparative framework for different kinds of IOs. In the essence, it is perfectly legitimate that no IOs with pooling and delegation levels close to 1 exist in the international system, however, this does not deteriorate the theoretical utility of these idealized cases. Data on the maximum and minimum levels

of pooling and delegation that come from the dataset is an empirical fact, as such, the scores for high and low authority levels may be adjusted according to the existing data.

In the dataset, 90th percentile of pooling score is 0.49 with the highest score being 0.53, while 90th percentile of delegation is 0.32 with the highest score of 0.46 (Appendix 3). These scores present an empirical reflection of high authority IOs with high delegation and pooling levels. Throughout the period from 1950 to 2010, there are two IOs that can be characterized as such: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Low IO authority is captured through the lowest 25th percentile: 0.11 and lower for pooling, and 0.06 and lower for delegation (Appendix 3). There is only one IO that consistently fulfils this condition throughout all the years in the dataset – the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Medium authority IOs, consequently, operate within these two extremes. The International Criminal Court (ICC) consistently has been scoring high on access provision and had pooling and delegation scores within the medium range, similar to the Organization for American States and the Council of Europe (Appendix 2). This illustrates the non-linear nature of correlation between two independent variables and access provision.

Figure 3: Association between the level of delegation and TNA Access in 2010.



Source: author.

Main Models

Results presented on Table 4 support these trends. I start with a simple OLS regression in the model 1 including all independent and control variables. In accordance with the expectations, there is statistically significant negative relationship between *Pooling_SQ* and *TNA Access*: the rate of change in *TNA Access* in an IO depends on the IO's level of pooling. Since sign for *Pooling* is positive, and sign for *Pooling_SQ* is negative, results indicate that the effect of pooling is positive until the level of pooling reaches 0.422 threshold, after which its effect becomes negative. IOs with the level of pooling of 0.422 provide the highest level of access. As such, there is inverted U-shaped relationship between *TNA Access* and *Pooling_SQ*.

Although having a negative sign, *Delegation_SQ* has no statistically significant effect on the level of access provision. In the terms of magnitude, the effect of pooling is strongest among all statistically significant variables included in the model. *Decision* comes the second: IOs with the international decision-making powers on average provide less access than IOs with fewer powers.

In order to specifically account for how authority and access vary over time, I employ fixed effects OLS regression controlling for years and IOs in the models 2 and 3. The model 2 includes only main independent variables in the absence of control variables. Picture remains the same; *Pooling_SQ* is negative and significant, although its magnitude almost doubles. *Delegation_SQ* remains insignificant.

The model 3 is a base model with all control variables included. Even in the presence of control variables, *Pooling_SQ* keeps its significance and increases the magnitude of its effect. In the base model, the threshold level of pooling is 0.403: IOs that have the level of pooling equal to 0.403 provide the highest access level to TNAs; IOs with pooling levels below and higher than this, provide less access. Interestingly, *Delegation_SQ* becomes significant at 95% level of confidence, having a positive effect on the level of access. *Decision* and *Security*'s effects on *TNA Access* remain negative and statistically significant, scoring the third after *Pooling_SQ* and *Delegation_SQ* in the terms of the magnitudes. With 1110 observations, the two-way fixed effects OLS explains 70% of within-IOs variation over the whole period in the dataset.

Table 2: Regression results for simple OLS and fixed effect OLS models.

	OLS	Fixed Effects OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3: Base model)
POOLING	1.20*** (0.14)	2.15*** (0.22)	2.21*** (0.22)
POOLING_SQ	-1.42*** (0.24)	-2.02*** (0.39)	-2.74*** (0.40)
DELEGATION	0.10 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.33 (0.20)
DELEGATION_SQ	-0.00 (0.40)	0.09 (0.41)	1.09** (0.47)
AFFINITY OF MEMBERS	-0.27*** (0.03)	—	-0.07 (0.04)
DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS	0.02*** (0.00)	—	0.00*** (0.00)
DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER	0.08*** (0.01)	—	0.02 (0.02)
DECISION	-0.5*** (0.03)	—	-0.86*** (0.07)
SECURITY	-0.27*** (0.02)	—	-0.73*** (0.10)
TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY	-0.00 (0.01)	—	-0.31*** (0.03)
LOCAL ACTIVITIES	0.11*** (0.02)	—	0.01 (0.03)
NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES	0.25*** (0.02)	—	0.14*** (0.04)
<i>Intercept</i>	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.08)
R ² : Within		0.64	0.71
Between		0.12	0.45
Overall	0.57	0.23	0.40
# of observations	1110	1211	1110

Source: author. **Note:** *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; Standard Errors are in brackets. Models (2) and (3) include organization-fixed effect and year dummies.

Robustness Check

I run three additional models in order to check for the robustness of results. Firstly, I run fixed effects OLS models while clustering for standard errors on IOs in order to check for heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation. Results are reported on Table 4. As in previous models, *Pooling_SQ* remains negative and significant, although its magnitude reaches the highest level among all estimated models: IOs with the level of pooling of 0.38 provide the highest level of access; IOs with pooling levels lower and higher than this threshold provide less access. *Delegation_SQ* also does not illustrate any changes in comparison to previous models. Out of eight control variables, only two has statistical significance: *Decision*, which keeps its negative effect on the level of access, and surprisingly, *Affinity of Members* that did not show significance in the base model (4). One-point increase in *Affinity of Members* is associated with 0.22-point drop in *TNA Access*.

Following Tallberg and his co-authors (2014: 761) that used the same *TNA Access* variable in their study, I also run Tobit regression for the model 5. The choice is motivated by the type of data-points distribution for the dependent variable *TNA Access*: it is left-censored at zero, thereby indicating a higher density of data-points that score zero in comparison to data-points scoring higher than zero. In the essence, whether *TNA Access* is equal to zero or not indicates whether an IO provides access to TNAs or not, and all values higher than zero indicate the degree of access provision (Tallberg et al., 2014: 761). Tobit model presents a better suit to account for this left-censored bias in the data, which allows to get the most of information from “theoretically relevant zero entries” (Tallberg et al., 2014: 761). In other words, as these data points reflect empirical observations, even small unnoticeable variations among values that are close to zero may have theoretical significance. Results do not differ a lot from fixed effects OLS model. *Pooling_SQ* still has the strongest effect and it is still negative. The effect of pooling on access stays positive till it reaches the threshold level of 0.395, after which its effect becomes negative. *Decision*, *Security*, and few of other control variables illustrate the same statistically significant but limited effects on *TNA Access*. Among all models, Tobit model provides the strongest support for my hypothesis. This is due to the fact that surprisingly, *Delegation_SQ* acquires negative sign which is significant at 95% confidence level: IOs with the delegation level of 0.286 provide the highest level of access to TNAs, while IOs with delegation levels lower and higher than this provide less access. The magnitude of its effect also turns out to be the strongest after the effect of pooling.

Lastly, building from the logic that values in the *TNA Access* variable that take value of higher than zero indicate the general openness of IOs, I construct a dummy *Open* dependent variable, which takes value of 1 if *TNA Access* is higher than zero, and takes value of 0 if otherwise. I run Logit regression in order to test the implications of the substituted dependent variable. Logistic regression

Table 3: Alternative models for Robustness check.

	Fixed Effects Clustered S.E.	Tobit	Logit
	(4)	(5)	(6)
POOLING	2.54*** (0.95)	1.93*** (0.20)	22.85*** (2.77)
POOLING_SQ	-3.26*** (1.42)	-2.44*** (0.34)	-31.17*** (4.39)
DELEGATION	0.15 (0.67)	0.66*** (0.24)	8.82*** (3.03)
DELEGATION_SQ	0.71 (1.59)	-1.15** (0.54)	-22.87*** (7.19)
AFFINITY OF MEMBERS	-0.22*** (0.09)	-0.37*** (0.04)	-4.65*** (0.70)
DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS	0.01 (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.31*** (0.02)
DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER	0.02 (0.07)	0.10*** (0.01)	1.40*** (0.28)
DECISION	-0.92*** (0.30)	-0.77*** (0.05)	-9.07*** (0.82)
SECURITY	-0.71 (0.48)	-0.35*** (0.04)	-4.72*** (0.48)
TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY	-0.29 (0.15)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.29)
LOCAL ACTIVITIES	-0.04 (0.14)	0.16*** (0.03)	-1.35 (0.49)
NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES	0.19 (0.19)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.77 (0.48)
<i>Intercept</i>	0.20 (0.27)	-0.31 (0.06)	-2.69*** (0.86)
R ² within	0.65		
between	0.48		
overall	0.40		
# of observations	1211	1110	1110

Source: the author. **Note:** *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; Standard Errors are in brackets.

is also a useful tool when having data that lacks normal distribution, which is the case with the present dataset: as previously mentioned, zero-values dominate among data points. Looking at general direction of coefficients, we can observe that as in the two previous models, both *Pooling_SQ* and *Delegation_SQ* have negative signs, indicating that on average, IOs with higher levels of pooling and delegation are likely to provide less access for TNAs than IOs with less pooling and delegation levels. Control variables keep their previous signs.

As it can be seen from the models, although estimates for pooling are consistently statistically significant, estimates for delegation lack such consistency. In the models 3, 4 and 5, IOs with pooling level around 0.4 provided the highest levels of access. In the same models, only in the Tobit regression estimates for delegation were statistically significant. This brings an interesting implication for the intergovernmental-transnational conflict in IOs: these results may suggest that pooling is a more fundamental dimension of international authority and as such, IOs are still predominantly characterized by their intergovernmental dimension. Alternatively, it may be the case that pooled authority is more determining factor in one governance tasks, while delegated authority is in another. These hypotheses need further testing.

Conclusion

The study makes a claim that the level of international authority of IOs plays one of the determining roles in their levels of access provision. It argues that IOs with the highest level of international authority are able to provide access, but they do not see functional benefit in doing so. IOs with the lowest authority are neither able nor willing to provide access. IOs with the medium level of authority have higher opportunity and willingness to provide access as they want to use it to overcome authority limitations for the fulfilment of their mandate goals.

The findings present an entry point into the understanding of how elites within IOs, namely, international secretariats develop their own preferences, and in which situations they decide to proceed with the advancement of their preferences. International secretariats may have interest in effective achievement of mandate goals and gaining more autonomy and resources from member-states. They base their actions on legal-rational framework of delegated authority and move on from there to proceed with achieving their interests. IOs engage TNAs only when they experience authority shortage, but still enjoy just enough authority to be able to set up institutional mechanisms for access provision. Further research should employ a more extensive dataset covering a wider scope of IOs and a mix of different quantitative and qualitative tools.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Table 4: List of Abbreviations of Names of International Organizations.

African Union	<i>AU</i>
Andean Community	<i>CAN</i>
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	<i>APEC</i>
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	<i>ASEAN</i>
Arab Maghreb Union	<i>AMU</i>
Bank for International Settlements	<i>BIS</i>
Caribbean Community	<i>CARICOM</i>
Central African Economic and Monetary Union	<i>CEMAC</i>
Commonwealth of Nations	<i>COMW</i>
Council of Europe	<i>CoE</i>
European Free Trade Association	<i>EFTA</i>
Intergovernmental Authority on Development	<i>IGAD</i>
International Criminal Court	<i>ICC</i>
International Monetary Fund	<i>IMF</i>
International Whaling Commission	<i>IWC</i>
Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	<i>OAPEC</i>
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	<i>OECD</i>
Organization for Islamic Cooperation	<i>OIC</i>
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	<i>OSCE</i>
Organization of American States	<i>OAS</i>
Nordic Council	<i>NC</i>
North American Free Trade Association	<i>NAFTA</i>
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	<i>NATO</i>
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization	<i>NAFO</i>
Pacific Islands Forum	<i>PIF</i>
Shanghai Cooperation Organization	<i>SCO</i>
United Nations	<i>UN</i>
World Bank	<i>WB</i>
World Trade Organization	<i>WTO</i>

Appendix 2

Table 5: 29 IOs and their levels of delegation, pooling and TNA access in 2010.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION	DELEGATION	POOLING	ACCESS
<i>International Criminal Court</i>	0.34	0.37	1.21
Organization of American States	0.24	0.4	1.17
Council of Europe	0.4	0.48	0.90
Andean Community	0.39	0.26	0.83
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	0.18	0.19	0.80
African Union	0.3	0.5	0.78
United Nations	0.2	0.49	0.75
European Free Trade Association	0.21	0.15	0.63
Pacific Islands Forum	0.27	0.31	0.62
Nordic Council	0.08	0.09	0.58
World Bank	0.17	0.39	0.57
Organization for Islamic Cooperation	0.05	0.34	0.53
Commonwealth of Nations	0.25	0.31	0.51
International Whaling Commission	0.05	0.33	0.51
Caribbean Community	0.31	0.33	0.50
World Trade Organization	0.44	0.49	0.49
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	0.14	0.11	0.48
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization	0.14	0.32	0.44
Intergovernmental Authority on Development	0.05	0.19	0.38
North American Free Trade Association	0.21	0.07	0.37
<i>Central African Economic and Monetary Union</i>	0.46	0.28	0.35
International Monetary Fund	0.30	0.30	0.31
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	0.25	0.13	0.28
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	0.01	0.04	0.27
Shanghai Cooperation Organization	0.08	0.20	0.18
Organization for Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	0.19	0.22	0.17

North Atlantic Treaty Organization	0.13	0.07	0.15
<i>Bank for International Settlements</i>	0.33	0.52	0.04
Arab Maghreb Union	0.19	0.02	0.02
<i>Note: Sorted by the highest level of TNA access to lowest. Highest scores are highlighted.</i>			

Source: the author.

Appendix 3

Table 6: Summary Statistics of All Variables.

	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
TNA ACCESS	1211	0.26	0.26	0	1.21
POOLING	1211	0.25	0.16	0	0.53
DELEGATION	1211	0.17	0.10	0	0.46
AFFINITY OF MEMBERS	1117	-0.71	0.17	-0.98	0.09
DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS	1164	3.56	5.08	-8.75	10
DEMOCRATIC MAJOR POWER	1211	0.33	0.47	0	1
DECISION	1211	0.39	0.19	0	1
SECURITY	1211	0.07	0.22	0	1
TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY	1211	0.61	0.45	0	2
LOCAL ACTIVITIES	1211	0.20	0.21	0	1
NON-COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES	1211	0.14	0.26	0	1

Source: the author.

Appendix 4

Table 4: Top 3 IOs with highest and lowest scores for delegation, pooling and access.

Levels	Delegation	Pooling	Access
Top 3 IOs	CEMAC, WTO, CoE	UN, BIS, AU	ICC, OAS, CoE
Bottom 3 IOs	SCO, OSCE, APEC	ASEAN, NC, OIC	BIS, AU, WB

Source: the author.