Demoicracy as a viable outcome of a party-less European Union

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Abstract

The European Union today is a cosmopolitan entity that functions in conjunction with political parties. This reliance on parties is one example of cosmopolitanism’s need to replicate the nation-state at supranational and intergovernmental levels. Maintaining the European Union as its case study, this paper explores the plausibility and requirements for demoicracy adoption as the form of governance for the European Union. This paper reveals that demoicracy can permit partyless governance to a greater extent than cosmopolitanism. This not only exposes the concomitant relationship between parties and cosmopolitanism, but also the benefits of partyless governance. The paper informs that parties need to be avoided due to a hindrance of citizen representation. To deepen our understanding of this notion, parties and cosmopolitanism are examined in the paper as extensions of the project of modernity.

Keywords

Cogito, Cosmopolitanism, Demoicracy, European Union, Modernity, Phenomenology
Introduction

The levels of political and civil freedom, on a world scale, are continually growing (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 10); however, is there a direct link between these freedoms and democracy? Today, democracy appears to be the only form of government with legitimacy nationally and globally, in that its ideal is to claim that individual rights have a rule in government actions (West 1996: 155). It is safe to state, however, that there are growing disaffections with many of the institutions of democracy. If democracy can be termed by Andreas Follesdal as: “a set of institutionally established procedures that regulate competition for control over political authority...the government is accountable to, and thereby responsive to, all those subject to it (Follesdal 2012: 100)” then the legitimacy of a transnational institution like the European Union (henceforth, the EU) should depend on perceiving the party as a threat rather than as a contributor to this concept of democracy. This project aims to show, through qualitative comparative research, that the cosmopolitan political party should be removed from its role as the key player in democracies and that such a removal would lead to demoicracy being considered as a more inclusive model for citizen and EU member state participation. The EU was used as our case study to test this claim and to portray the party as undermining citizen and member state inclusion in the decision making process. In order to show the contributions cosmopolitanism and the party provide to the democratic deficit in the EU, this paper first looks at the threefold relationship between the origins of the party, its relationship with the modern individual, and cosmopolitanism. Second, it compares the role deliberation plays in the current cosmopolitan EU, which is juxtaposed to deliberation’s role under demoicracy. Finally, it looks at how phenomenology, in rejecting the natural attitude of modernity, can coincide with demoicratic ideals.

In order to provide more authentic autonomy to citizens and member states in the EU, there is a demand today for more horizontal channels of participation and self-creation. A partyless model of statehood is fruitful because it can demand a shift from traditional democracy towards a warranted deliberative demoicracy. Why is this warranted? Such a demoicracy, as we take demoicracy to mean a multi-demos form of governance that promotes horizontal intersubjectivity, will be shown to provide for more effective and efficient citizen and member state participation. This will be done by demoicracy being juxtaposed to a cosmopolitan or post national democratic view of EU integration and governance.

Cosmopolitanism can be considered an outgrowth of modernity, as it can be considered an ideal that is progressive and humanistic whilst being entrenched in modernity’s structural conditions (Kendall, Woodward, Skrbis 2009: 12). Cosmopolitanism will be shown to involve a uni-demos form of governance that promotes vertical power relations. This latter form will be shown to
require the political party as a necessary ingredient. Due to the unlikelihood that the traditional nation-state will completely disintegrate within the EU, and since pure horizontal decision making between citizens will never be entirely feasible (due to the notion that nation-states will most likely always require some form of vertical power relations with the EU and likewise with citizens), we will see that a compromise between the horizontal and vertical channels of political participation can be attained more thoroughly through democracy than through cosmopolitanism. We will be able to consider, therefore, that more diagonal participation as the synthesis between horizontal and vertical channels of participation for decision-making is possible in the EU and its member states through deliberative democracy. This compromise is a possible strategy to tackle the democratic deficit in the EU.

The origin of the political party and the cogito

The political party arose in Western society via numerous paths to inclusive democracy, which were based on industrialization and franchise (West 1996: 17). It is important to note however, that although the modern state (which was arguably derived from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 or even earlier in the sixteenth century while global interconnectedness emerged with the world economy’s expansion; Held 2006: 292) has had a reciprocal existence with the party throughout history, it did not gain direct control over populations with direct income tax until the 1800s (James 2002: 66). Although the primitive political party can be traced back to ancient Athens where different groups attempted to influence decisions in the assembly based on locality, social status, and occupation, traces of today’s modern party are found in the 1700s (Daalder 2001: 40). There are many arguments on the historical origin of the party, but the party should be considered overall as an organization that links rulers and ruled, and seeks to perpetuate representation by attaining power via nominating candidates in elections.

The party and Descartes’ (1596-1650) cogito (the human being whose consciousness exists because it thinks) came into existence during the same era, which is no coincidence. The latter became the common conception of the individual as self, just as the party became the common institution to govern. The problem that derives from the Cartesian self (cogito) is that in knowing that it thinks and doubts that it exists, knowledge’s value becomes instrumental. Therefore, knowledge makes life more certain and more comfortable in its ability to improve, predict, and control nature (West 1996: 14). For our purposes, we need to see the party as an extension of this conception of self within society, as the party is also a product of the Enlightenment. The party, however, has the role of improving the organization of society, allowing for the predictions of how government will be governed, and controlling society by reducing individuals to objects for power through votes that
are taken at the expense of their authenticity. Instrumental knowledge is thus the product of the modern identity and the party, and such knowledge travels vertically, which is the movement of power of cosmopolitanism.

The Enlightenment was a new mode of thinking that was a philosophical, intellectual, and cultural movement in the 18th century. It is regarded as the arrival in the intellectual sphere of developments and events that would transform European society forever. This new thinking commenced the idea of the Modern period, which started approximately around the 16th century. This was before the maturation of the state and party, but during which the West involved a mindset based on an objectifiable *cogito* (West 1996: 7). We can see in retrospect that around the 16th century, the party was warranted by individuals, since there was a departure from the past and a new sense of time developed the self-consciousness of the West. The West claimed its institutions maintained a privileged relationship to rationality, as Europeans saw themselves as superior to non-Western cultures (West 1996: 7). The West, therefore, considered itself superior to other cultures in virtue of its thought, values, the development of the modern state, political entities, and capitalism, concluding that it is modern because it is rational (West 1996: 8). It is no surprise that we see the party deriving from this modern era, evolving into the basic form that it does today. We accept this notion, since it is when the primitive 16th century party morphed into the advanced modern party through ideas from the Enlightenment. As a result of this ‘chemistry’, the Enlightened party was able to entrench itself into the project of modernity with the *cogito* as its model citizen. The party began to manipulate and rationalize society and politics to an even more Newtonian and thus mechanistic extent, bursting its way through European and North American society (Daalder 2001: 40). After its development through the Middle Ages, Hans Daalder informs the party in Britain in the 18th century as the place of origin for the modern political party, as it is: “when the organization of parliamentary support and attempts to influence the outcome of elections became questions of vital concern...when David Hume spoke of ‘factions from interest’…and Edmund Burke made a clear case for the party as being ‘a body of men united upon a particular principle to promote the common good of men’ (Daalder 2001: 40).”

We now see that the political party is modern because it is rational, and rationalization in the Weberian sense involves abandoning traditional romantic practices and customs in favour of procedures that are designed to achieve goals more efficiently; hence, the party allows the state to organize means that are efficient in order to realize ends, or in other words, rationalize (West 1996: 63). From this, we can maintain that the political party is a key player in society’s instrumental rationalization (West 1996: 8). Since society is composed of manipulable individuals, society itself is manipulable. Changing our conceptions on self can therefore change our conceptions on society.
To undermine the *cogito*, we need to understand Descartes as having naturalized the self as a *cogito* made of two distinct substances. The mental found inside the physical is an important facet of this natural attitude that views everything in reality, including other individuals, as physical and thus manipulable. This provoked Husserl's dissatisfaction with such an attitude since it was incapable of truly understanding consciousness and thus the individual self (Moran 2013: 91). The party is able to manipulate society and reduce the individual to a physical object, in virtue of this natural attitude. This attitude is an achievement of modernity that extended to politics through the parties that formed the democratization process and its physical constitution. Such a claim has caused a blur between democracy, the state, the self, and the party, and so to undermine the *cogito* and its modern companion ‘the party’, is to change our perspectives on the socio-political realm by undermining the natural attitude we embrace. When we do so, we can realise that our authenticity as human beings in the political realm is being sacrificed for the sake of party dominance, cosmopolitanism, and vertical power relations.

Undermining the natural attitude can lead to undermining the legitimacy of the political party and reciprocally, cosmopolitanism. Demoicracy thus becomes a more legitimate candidate for EU governance when we view the social world as being composed of horizontal relations. The support of horizontal participation, in which the multitude of *demoi* as member states and/or citizens maintain their identities rather than sacrificed into a demos for vertical power relations, is what demoicracy provides. By challenging the verticality of cosmopolitanism, the party, and traditional democracy, demoicracy can provide for the birth of new roles for citizens but also for member states within the EU.

**The lost role of the political party**

Due to cosmopolitan attitudes in the EU, independent politicians, who we argue are the most representative of their constituencies and citizens (in virtue of being free from the political party’s hold) are scarce. The replication of national democracies at the EU level by cosmopolitan attitudes promotes democracies that are always tacitly tainted by the party. Since real democratic politics has traditionally taken place in national arenas, to replicate such politics at the EU level is not problematic for cosmopolitanism. George Ross comments that the gap: “between the thickness of national democratic deliberative practices and the thinness of these practices at the European level is clear, and the consequences profound” (Ross 2006: 126). Extending nation-state democracy to the EU level increases vertical power and thus exacerbates the *authenticity deficit* member states and citizens suffer from within the EU. This can be manifested in the intimacy between cosmopolitan styled democracy and the political party. The functions of parties monopolize the political process,
which are grouped between representative functions (policy formulation, interest articulation, and interest aggregation) and institutional/procedural functions (Bartolini and Mair 2001: 331). Parties are so steeped in EU politics that they shape the vertical relations for EU institutions, which are created internally by elites or externally by social groups. Parties thus act as the most decisive agents for recruiting political ideas and expressing or articulating policy demands (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 17).

The problem with the party today is that it has forgotten how to represent and aggregate interests. Citizens today are dealing with parties initially designed to translate the interests of the citizenry to the state authority, yet it has become that authority itself. Due to this ‘dire switch’, the party, which was once relied on to influence authority to represent individual interests, has become institutionalized and now needs to be lobbied as much as the state authority itself. Unfortunately, in the EU, parties have managed to institutionalize themselves. Parties have already taken control of the dynamics of internal affairs through EU funding. We see this with funding to the main eight parties in European Parliament, justified in the Treaty on the European Union article 10 paragraph 4 and in the Treaty on the E.U.’s Functioning, article 224’ (Europarl.europa.eu 2017). Due to these treaties, independent ministers in the EU do not stand much of a chance of being elected, as there are only fifteen independent ministers in Parliament (a.k.a., non-inscrits) (Europarl.europa.eu 2017).

The loss of authenticity in the EU is becoming more severe for its citizens as the ever increasing global system changes and impinges on member states and thus on an individual’s autonomy and sovereignty (Held 2006: 303). In addition, the party perpetuates this loss as it can resort to coercive acts by party members that lead to unjust methods for getting a citizens’ vote, such as extortion or even vote buying (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 14). We can characterize the modern party as avoiding personal contact with voters in order to focus on the wider support that it needs in the face of competition from other parties. This support reflects the objectifying nature of the modern rationalizing project, as citizens become a means to political ends. Such objectification of citizens comes at the expense of the state having any tangible contact with the majority of voters, which undermines deliberative participation from citizens. Ideology thus takes over as being the most important aspect that a party can possess and market to the masses. This ideological based party is the most popular modern party in these times and it is the catchall party, and it flourishes within the EU.

The historical trajectory of the modern party can be understood to have gone from elite to mass party, to catch-all party, and finally to electoral-professional party (though these last two models are vaguely different with the latter in more developed and democratically advanced countries; Kitschelt 2001: 328). The catchall party sets out to maximize votes, govern, and win elections;
essentially, it attempts to aggregate the widest variety of social interests (Gunther and Diamond 2001: 26). We can understand this aggregation as involving rationalizing social integration where leaders and followers are instilled with bonds of religion, class, or ethnicity (Daalder 2001: 46). The political catch-all party is perhaps one of the most efficient vehicles that modernity provides for society to overcome issues of collective action and social choice, but which today does not provide responsive and accountable services to the citizenry (Kitschelt 2001: 300). This deficit can be thought of as a result of modern democracy being built on the principle of territorial representation via electoral districts, not on the functional representation of areas of policy and sectional interests. As a result, the political party has now benefitted from the naïve legitimacy and status the public gives it through their natural attitude. The attitude thus frames the party as a key device for political representation, governmental organization, democracy’s maintenance, and accountability, but also the vertical power relations of EU cosmopolitanism (Kitschelt 2001: 328). This role comes at the expense of the true interests of citizens, since a vote is never translated perfectly into what a citizen wishes to gain or expect from government. It is safe to say then that the party, having successfully acquired its role as the key device for political organization, is also the key device today for political manipulation, since it cannot be held truly accountable once elected into power.

Since parties have been considered by many to be necessary for government, it is hard for us to remove them from their historical role. It is the harmonizer of different political processes and institutional orders within the state. Since this role has followed the party from the middle of the 19th Century to the beginning of the 21st Century, it is difficult to ‘strip them’ of the credit for numerous democratization processes today. We can support the idea that we have become so accustomed to their contribution to democracy that we overlook their real significance, which is in part due to the natural attitude. The party was the only institution that set out its task of integrating and allowing for the institutions and processes of democracy to be compatible (Kitschelt 2001: 339). However, this can be framed as a cosmopolitan notion as it has now lost this function. Today it is merely striving for power, as it aims to control individual and group behaviour via loyalty systems and identification (Kitschelt 2001: 339).

**Cosmopolitanism to Democracy?**

The cosmopolitan view on global democracy considers citizens as actors who perceive themselves as world citizens, not just national citizens (Held 1995). In the end, it sees the globalized context as creating a legitimacy gap for international entities like the EU, in that decisions are made outside the grasp of mere national processes. To compensate for this gap, or in other words democratic
deficit, democracy is considered a viable option to rectify this deficiency in political decision making. Today, there is a need for the democracy, which Susan Besson characterizes as: “a multi-layered and multi-centered democratic society within, among and beyond states” (Besson 2006: 185). Within member states, democracy supports the plurality within populations and provides increasing levels of empathy and authenticity amongst and between members within society through the promotion of horizontal intersubjective relations between members. Such horizontality is also possible between member states in the EU. Such relations provide ideal conditions for deliberation, whereas cosmopolitan views promote the replication of the nation-state at international and supranational levels. Cosmopolitanism thus directly and indirectly promotes the political party to continue its role as chief democratizer at the expense of the citizen, as the party dominates EU politics and its member states. The EU’s cosmopolitanism has therefore invited the party to dominate beyond its member states in virtue of vertical replication, whereas democracy vouches for public deliberation to take place between citizens at the core of political decisions that are legitimate and self-governmental (Besson 2006: 185).

In any just and fair society, deliberation is needed for preference formation over what individuals think should be a political order’s objectives, but also to consider what the best means to achieve those objectives are and with what trade-offs (Follesdal 2012: 102). Democracy has the potential to widen such deliberative participation at levels higher than that of cosmopolitanism. Democracy is based on the assumption that the EU is not a state that is constituted by demoi (peoples and/or states) that are separate nor demoi that are forged into a unity. As a result, democracy supports a transnational political demoi that is a plurality distinct and open to each other and their respective democratic systems. And so, democracy does not support a cosmopolitan unification via any pan-European demos (Nicolaïdis 2012: 252). For democrats, such EU unity is not possible due to the lack of a shared European identity (Follesdal 2012: 102). The acclaimed no-demos thesis for the EU pertains to this lack of unity when considering it as an organization, as it cannot truly have a democracy that is European because it is not possible to have a demos that is univocally European (Besson 2006: 187). We can state that there is no such thing as a demos without an ethnos in Europe (Besson 2006: 189).

Kalypso Nicolaïdis, in highlighting the deliberative action involved in democracy, frames this approach as a possible candidate for the EU (which can be extended to its members) because it involves: “an open-ended process of transformation which seeks to accommodate the tensions inherent in the pursuit of radical mutual opening between separate peoples” (Nicolaïdis 2012: 254). The political arrangement best suited for authentic identity formation for member states and individual citizens is supported by democracy, as it allows horizontal relationships to forge
between citizens and members. This is an attribute hindered by the EU’s cosmopolitan adherence to the political party. The party seeks to maintain the vertical relationships it establishes, as it mediates between citizen and government. The dismantling of the party therefore would allow citizens and member states to express their desires to a greater extent. This is just one reason why we see the party as being at odds with the horizontal mechanisms of representation that demoicracy promotes. Removing the party from EU cosmopolitan democracy thus opens the possibility for more deliberative participation between citizens and member states, which exposes the demos to the demands of the demoi. Such compromising of the current vertical channels of participation between citizens, party, and state, considers the possibility of diagonal approaches to political decision making and identity formation. The difficulty today with achieving this more diagonal state/citizen relationship, however, lies in the popular notion that the party is synonymous with democracy. Such a notion is an outgrowth of the natural attitude that is the attitude we have seen the society of modernity built upon (Moran 2013: 105).

**Deliberation through demoicracy at the EU level**

Although parties provide the most important link between the political process and citizens, it relies on a limited view of the individual citizen and of member states in the EU. Party platforms can provide the manner for interest and passion aggregation into public policy, and party competition provides the most trustworthy mechanism for accountability (Schmitter 2001: 67). However, authenticity is still undermined because of the difficulties that parties have in aggregating passions and interests (Schmitter 2001: 81). For citizens, results from a survey asking ECOSY (European Community Organisation of Socialist Youth) found that 81 percent of respondents trusted parties, and so party membership may be considered a more important variable than sociological factors when it comes to influencing attitudes and behaviour directed to the EU. However, the Eurobarometer survey only found that 17 percent of its respondents trusted political parties and over 70 percent did not (Speht 2005: 201). This latter figure coincided with the more recent research of van Biezen and Poguntke who found that since the 1980s, there had been an overall decrease in party membership in the EU (van Biezen and Poguntke 2014: 207). These findings can be interpreted to show that the party is lessening its importance in the democratic process in Europe, which could be a positive implication; however, it also reflects the lack of interest citizens feel toward participation.

Deliberation can compensate for the lack of representation the party provides by promoting discursive consensus and by permitting outside actors from government to participate in the democratic process. This horizontal attribute of deliberation involves a style of participation that is
a constituent of the participatory process that intersubjectively recognizes the plethora of relations between the different perspectives of the *demoi* (Cornish and Gillespie 2009: 19). Instead of narrowing the horizons of those views through a European *demos* that depends on cosmopolitan verticality, this intersubjectivity can be maintained at the EU level through more deliberative approaches to participation by individual citizens and member states. For the latter, these approaches cohere with the aim of demoocracy towards changing the democratic institutions of member states in order to allow them to participate internationally and act together to achieve goals as separate *demoi*, rather than in the cosmopolitan sense of creating new supranational institutions. These institutions subsume the international powers of national member states to eventually coalesce them into a *demos*. Deliberation is thus valued differently between demoocracy and cosmopolitanism, as the latter view strives for a democracy that is post-national and thus for the case of the EU, beyond member states, yet preventing them from disappearing altogether (Besson 2006: 182). Demoocracy promotes participation for member states in the EU that expresses national interests at the EU level.

The EU today strives to be cosmopolitan and handle the *state of nature* or anarchy that exists between European member states by subscribing to principles of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. This involves deeper and extended democracy across European states, regions, and global networks. Instead of changing democratic institutions at state level to cope with the internationalization of politics, which demoocracy allows, cosmopolitanism aims to develop a layer of institutions at the global level to complement the ones at the state level (Held 2006: 316). Cosmopolitan democracy thus aims to create new institutions above and co-existing with state systems, but allows the former to override states when it comes to activities with international and transnational results (Held 2006: 316). It aims to replicate member state systems at the international level, and since member states have parties entrenched in their democracies, the cosmopolitan approach for the EU allows parties to wield excessive powers at the EU level as well. Although the building of channels for civic participation through deliberate means over decision making at the global and regional level is on the agenda for cosmopolitan democracy (Held 2006: 316), the party will always hinder such deliberation.

Today, globalization demands more international organization and co-operation. The possibility of recovering a deliberative and participatory democracy at local levels to entrench autonomy within sites of power and throughout spatial domains is challenged by the presence of the party (Held 2006: 318). Cosmopolitan democracy supports the political party; however, it is still anchored by multilateralism and international law, which makes it a political and cultural project that could be interpreted as suited and adapted to the EU’s global and regional age (Held 2006: 321). Today,
however, it should not be considered as an apt option for the EU. The EU could be more deliberative if its members changed their state governments and institutions to cope with the purpose of transnational co-operation, instead of relying on the cosmopolitan notion of creating new supranational and intergovernmental entities. One plausible action could be to demand a ‘double role’ be played by member state politicians. By representing their national state constituencies in their national member state parliaments, but additionally in the EU’s European Parliament, national member state politicians can prevent the need of having EU citizens elect separate politicians for the latter Parliament. Today, member states have their nationally elected members play a ‘double role’ through their heads of state in the European Council (Wood and Yesilada 2004: 96).

**Deliberation through demoicracy at the domestic level**

In its promotion of horizontal relations, we now see deliberation as opening the door for demoicracy at both EU and member state levels. Demoicracy, according to Nicolaïdis: “requires its many peoples not only to open up to one another but to recognize mutually their respective polities and all that constitutes them: their respective pasts, their social pacts, their political systems, their cultural traditions, their democratic practices” (Nicolaidis 2012: 248). Through the expanded horizons that deliberation and demoicracy provide, but which the party narrows, we can increase the possibility for empathy in society. The self-knowledge it provides by informing us what we are not, allows us to evaluate ourselves, which means empathy can allow us to acquire new values. The comprehension of others horizontally through the channels deliberate demoicracy provides can be the basis for value comparison (Nicolaidis 2012: 248). When a government allows such horizons and authenticity to flourish, it responds to its citizens’ preferences (Dahl 1998: 1). We have seen how the party hinders the expression of those preferences and for that; we learn how the EU can label the party as the main culprit for its democratic and authenticity deficit. This is why democracy in the EU is not practiced in a way that efficiently translates the popular will of citizens into symmetrical legislative outputs of deliberation (Norton 2000: 343). In order to value deliberative demoicracy and its horizontal participation, phenomenology is able to reveal its worth.

**Phenomenology as a political scientific method**

Juxtaposing between political sciences which commit to approaches to political reality that are quasi-mathematical on the one hand and phenomenological political science on the other, brings to light the meaning of the former’s commitment and such meaning’s limits (Cooper 1981: 102). Phenomenology focuses on intentional intersubjectivity and subjectivity in order to identify the
inter-relationships at play in the world’s constitution (Moran 2013: 95). It scrutinizes the natural attitude mentioned above, which is an attitude that reduces culture and society to objects and in turn ignores the human life-world which consists of intersubjective meaning (Moran 2013: 101). The natural attitude through the lens of phenomenology is exposed as an attitude that commits to the notion that the party is necessary for politics. Both this attitude and the party assist each other in reducing society to a manipulable physical field. Phenomenology on the other hand, by aiming to be a complete philosophy of social reality (Cooper 1981: 99), overcomes the ordinary fixed way we live, thus countering the fixity brought on by the natural attitude and the party (Cooper 1981: 101). And so, the life-world and its accompanying social reality through phenomenology are framed as meaning’s ultimate horizon. Within this reality several “sub-worlds” co-exist (work, theory, etc.), which is why Cooper propounds: “social reality is multi-dimensional, heterogeneous, and internally articulated. […] Phenomenology, then, contradicts the belief […] that self-understanding is most truly found by way of mathematical or quasi-mathematical formalism, which is called by its exponents, ‘objectivity’ (Cooper 1981: 102).” Phenomenology brings to the fore the notion that the social world, or *Lebenswelt*, in which we as human being reside, is a world which cannot be completely reduced to analysis. The party is a manifestation of the cosmopolitan aim to reach such a reduction by fixing individuals and member states in order to create an analyzable static world. The consequence of this is a ‘covering over’ of the fluid life-world of which we are a part (Moran 2013: 102). Alasdyr MacIntyre notes that through phenomenology, however, we can consider that there are many different approaches to being rational. The modern project of cosmopolitanism is not the only manner to attain rationality (MacIntyre 1988: 15). Countering such a modern project, phenomenology coincides with demoicracy’s approach of respecting the multi-demos (within its plurality) as rational. This involves judging the many accounts of justice in society instead of modernity’s approach of freeing ourselves from our traditions through abstracting ourselves from customs. Such abstracting has the goal of reaching neutrality or impartiality. Phenomenology and demoicracy do not aim to reach such a universal point of view, as we see their support of pluralism counters the cosmopolitan approach of monological replication.

From above, we can consider that deliberative demoicracy needs phenomenology as a method to reach its goals of mutual respect and recognition between *demoi*. In society, each individual standpoint should not just make emotive claims, but rather authentic ones if there is to be no overriding objective theory of practical rationality or justice (MacIntyre 1988: 354). Phenomenology is thus able to show us the value within demoicracy and the importance of the deterritorialization of the EU’s *demoi* for authentic transnational deliberation (Besson 2006: 183).
Phenomenology shows us the democratic notion that through others, the human mind manifests itself as dialogical, not monological (Taylor 1994: 31). Since we can never truly free ourselves from our traditions nor abstract self from our customs in order to be neutral and impartial for reaching a rational universal cosmopolitan point of view (MacIntyre 1988: 15), we will never reach a true pan-European demos. Democracy is thus a feasible candidate for the complications of participation in the EU and its members. The EU is an institution that should be joined by citizens who recognize phenomenologically created as an intersubjective identity for themselves that counters cosmopolitan pan-Europeanization and party identification. European citizenship counters alienation phenomenologically by involving a democratic ‘siblinghood’ based on mutual recognition; a form of identity that shifts amongst the multiple demoi and thus reveals the social constructed identity formed through horizontal democratic ideas (Cheneval and Nicolaidis 2016: 9). Through the method of phenomenology, we are thus able to examine identity in the EU, but also how the EU institutions themselves are created through horizontal and intersubjective means. Through the promotion of a transnationality, democracy is phenomenological in scope as it emphasizes the horizontal and mutual openness between individuals in a shared polity (Nicolaïdis 2012: 252). It should contest against the Kantian based liberal democratic society, which allowed for the cosmopolitan model of the EU to dominate.

One of the dire consequences for the cosmopolitan model is due to the vertical relations between states and citizens. This model’s preference is a political arrangement in which one dominant culture suppresses the plurality of minority ones through a demos. It aims to convert minority cultures into one universal pan-European identity existing through monological and vertical assimilation (Taylor 1994: 68). For Charles Taylor, an individual is not authentic from any inward derivation or cogito because such inwardness cannot be the only source of identity; hence, the crucial feature of human life neglected under modernity is human life’s dialogical character (Taylor 1994: 32). For Taylor, within the politics of difference, a universal potential or power in society is not about coalescing identities into a universal uni-demos, as cosmopolitanism, the party, and the current EU aims to do, but through collective culture and so a multi-demos (Taylor 1994: 42). Cosmopolitanism does not coincide with this pluralistic view of identity, rather it considers the concepts of the good and just as sufficient for providing identity in virtue of being acknowledged vertically between the state and citizen (Habermas 1994: 111). For the cosmopolitan supporter Habermas, who prefers an EU based on a constitution (Nicolaïdis 2012: 251), we can see why cosmopolitanism is uni-demos or pro-demos and anti-pluralist, as it requires an EU with a demos at the top to orchestrate the vertical relations with citizens and member states below.
Conclusion

The party-less model of governance for the EU reciprocates with deliberative democracy by allowing for more authentic citizens to live within an intersubjective society. Of course, there are numerous factors not mentioned in this study that can assist in the justification and manifestation of a democracy in the EU. Proportional representation as a voting system, for example, increases the chances of independents winning elections. The non-partisan state legislature in Nebraska, as one example, shows increased independence of ministers that can lead to unicameral legislatures. Charlyne Berens explicates the benefits of this model, claiming that for this legislature’s architect George Norris: “one house would eliminate the need for conference committees and make the legislature’s workings far more open, and individual legislators far more accountable (Berens 2005: 9).” Corporatism is also worth mentioning as cohering with deliberative democracy. Corporatism is opposed to a pluralist approach to private and public sector relations, as pluralism (not to be confused with the pluralism of identity formation above) maintains a clear division between the private and public spheres of a state, where government does not aim to work with interest groups and business horizontally, but rather performs policies that avoid opposition (Norton 2000: 57). Corporatism on the other hand provides for more horizontal decision-making, blurring the separation between private and public interests (Cradden 1994: 101). This clearly shows in its horizontal nature, a mutual compatibility with democratic norms. As for the international sphere for the EU, we should also mention whether or not international law should be placed under national member state responsibility or the EU’s. Having the EU responsible, we have seen, is a more cosmopolitan approach to liberal internationalism, since it aims to eliminate the anarchy between member nations via international institutions (Jackson and Sorensen 1999: 119). This leads us to question if universal rights should be considered above the nation-state and international law or in the case of Europe, recognized only by the EU.

The EU is an organization that provokes its demos to question their identities, but by doing this, it also puts its own identity under scrutiny. The intersubjectivity between separate demos themselves and between demos and the EU itself, can be investigated through phenomenological methods of identity politics. When identity is uncovered this way we do not just encounter fruitful conceptions of the self and member state nationality, but we also see that the political party does not respect the fluidity of identity, but rather fixes it to the party. This fixing is responsible for much of the political anxiety citizens and member states of the EU face today. Perhaps this is one of the aspects which the voters in favour of Brexit were appealing to when they voted to leave the EU. It can be interpreted as an indirect ‘cry’ for a democracy in the EU; however, it is important we note that investigation into the truth of this interpretation is one for which phenomenology can ascertain.
References


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